if team members have an adequate shared understanding of the task, team, equipment, and situation (e.g., Duncan et al., 1996; Rouse, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1992) .
Although there have been several theoretical papers describing team mental models (e.g., Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Kraiger & Wenzel, 1997; Rentsch & Hall, 1994) , empirical work has substantially lagged behind conceptual development. Much of the research on shared mental models simply provides indirect support for the construct (e.g., Oser, McCallum, Salas, & Morgan, 1989) or uses shared mental models as a post hoc explanation for performance differences between teams (e.g., Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989; Orasunu, 1990) . According to Kraiger and Wenzel (1997) , "shared mental models have yet to be directly measured, though some researchers have assessed some components of mental models" (p. 64). Despite little direct evidence demonstrating the existence of team mental models or their relationship to performance, the consensus appears to be that the construct holds enough potential to warrant further investigation (e.g., Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Kraiger & Wenzel, 1997) .
Throughout the literature, there have been numerous calls for research to focus specifically on the direct measurement of shared mental models and to evaluate multiple measures (e.g., Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Converse, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1991; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Kraiger & Wenzel, 1997) . However, these calls have generally gone unheeded. We contend that two primary reasons for the paucity of empirical work on team mental models are (a) a lack of adequate conceptual development of the construct and (b) confusion over how to measure cognitive structures at the group level. In this article, we attempt to address both of these issues in order to promote the advancement of empirical research on team mental models.
We hope that this article will contribute in several ways. First, we emphasize the interplay between theory and measurement by highlighting the conceptual work that must precede the selection of any measurement tool. Second, we delineate standards for measures of group-level cognitions. Thus, the reader will not only be able to see why we favor specific approaches but will also be able to use the set of criteria developed to evaluate measurement alternatives in the future. Finally, we review and evaluate four techniques that appear to hold promise for measuring group-level cognition: pathfinder (PF) analysis, multidimensional scaling (MDS), interactively elicited cause mapping, and text-based cause mapping. This article will be organized in the following manner. After discussing pertinent conceptual issues, we describe a set of dimensions that can be used to evaluate the attributes, advantages, and disadvantages of group-level cognitive structure measurement techniques. We then use these dimensions to critique the four measurement approaches. Based on our evaluation, we will offer recommendations for choosing a measurement tool. Finally, we will suggest potentially fruitful research directions.
At the simplest level, a mental model is a cognitive structure or network of associations between concepts in each individual's mind (Ward & Reingen, 1990) . Team mental models are team members' shared, organized understanding and mental representation of knowledge or beliefs about key elements of the team's relevant environment (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994) . Rather than being dichotomous in orientation, degrees of sharing exist.
Researchers have suggested at least four different content domains of team mental models (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Duncan et al., 1996; Rouse et al., 1992) . One includes the knowledge of equipment and tools used by the team (an equipment model). Another contains an understanding about the work that the team is to accomplish, including its goals or performance requirements and the problematics facing the team (task mental model). A third reflects an awareness of team member characteristics, including representations of what individual members know and believe, their skills, preferences, and habits (team member mental model). A fourth mental model captures what is known or believed by team members with regard to what are appropriate or effective processes. Minionis, Zaccaro, and Perez (1995) refer to this as a team interaction model, whereas Rentsch and Hall (1994) call this a teamwork schema. Therefore, although the domain of a team model can vary (e.g., individual task work, team task work, teamwork), it should be viewed as reflecting how team members conceptualize a team-relevant phenomenon.
Although there is a paucity of literature investigating the determinants of team mental models, there is no shortage of possibilities in generating a list of antecedents. Kraiger and Wenzel (1997) suggest four categories of determinants: environmental (e.g., individualistic and/or collectivistic), organizational (e.g., training, rewards), team (e.g., task characteristics, shared efficacy), and individual (e.g., personality).
The construct of a shared mental model was developed to help explain performance differences between teams (Cannon- Bowers & Salas, 1990; Orasunu, 1990; Rouse et al., 1992) ; therefore, a common theoretical assumption is that they are precursors to effective team performance (e.g., Kraiger & Wenzel, 1997; Orasunu & Salas, 1993) . Team mental models not only facilitate information processing and foster increased coordination but also enable team members to formulate accurate teamwork and task work predictions (e.g., Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Rouse et al., 1992) . According to existing models (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Kraiger & Wenzel, 1997) , team mental models bring explanatory power to theories of team performance by influencing team capacity (readiness) and directly impacting team processes.
Knowledge Versus Belief Structures
A distinction that has not been articulated in the literature is between descriptive states of nature that one knows to be true (knowledge structures) and desired states that one prefers, expects, or demands (belief structures). Although most of the existing work has focused on knowledge structures (e.g., Jonassen, Beissner, & Yacci, 1993; Walsh, 1995) , we would like to expand the discussion to include the measurement of belief structures as well. We would argue that the team mental model construct should allow for or include the notion of shared, evaluative belief structures.
Theoretical work on attitudes and social cognition has clearly characterized group evaluative belief sets as shared cognitive structures (Ward & Reingen, 1990) . Further-more, such evaluative belief structures can be represented by associative networks. In this case, it would be a network of relations between three types of concepts: attributes, inferences, and goals (Ward & Reingen, 1990, p. 247) . Each concept is discussed in sequence below.
Attributes are features of an experience that are noted or found meaningful by individuals. When mapping evaluative belief structures, attributes are often treated with regard to a like or dislike continuum. That is, they have valence and the potential to evoke affect.
Inferences are elaborations or projections with regard to an attribute that would not necessarily be included in its description. These are based on and can reflect assumptions or knowledge about an attribute, but they often stem from reasons for liking or not liking an attribute. In cognitive processing, inferences might represent or derive from thinking about the consequences or potential effects of attributes (Ward & Reingen, 1990) . Thus, a particular attribute will be processed differently depending on the inferences drawn from it.
Goals are desired states or ends. In the context of making decisions or choices, goals relate to the evaluation of alternatives. Thus, how we feel about an alternative depends on its attributes, the inferences drawn, and the relation of attributes to our goals at the time. To illustrate, if encountered late in the workday, a task with the attribute of complexity may not be viewed favorably when our goal is to leave work early.
Just as inferences are connected to attributes, attributes are connected to goals. Such connections are viewed as beliefs (Ward & Reingen, 1990) . In mapping the connection of attributes, inferences, and goals, we are, in effect, capturing cognitive structures. However, we are going beyond describing what team members know about a phenomenon or how they think about a phenomenon (knowledge structures). Instead, we are characterizing how they feel about it (evaluative belief structures).
The difference between knowledge structures and belief structures is a subtle but relevant one for both theoretical and measurement reasons. From a theoretical perspective, it is likely that team members will develop common knowledge structures more readily than belief structures. In addition, one might expect belief structures to be less stable than knowledge structures. Not only can knowledge structures reinforce beliefs but belief structures are also likely to influence strongly the acquisition, storage, organization, and integration of knowledge.
From a measurement perspective, the distinction between knowledge and belief structures is important to consider because each will present different methodological challenges. For example, one might expect that issues of privacy and/or reactivity of measurement would be more salient with belief structures. On the other hand, the correct mental models are often identified for an estimate of accuracy with knowledge structures (e.g., Goldsmith & Johnson, 1990 ) but would be quite problematic with belief structures because of their subjective and evaluative nature. the dynamics involved in the utilization or activation of such a structure in the service of some decision or task (processing). According to Schneider and Angelmar (1993) , cognitive structures are "representations of knowledge that contain and organize information" (p. 349), whereas cognitive processes refer to how "knowledge is selected, organized, transformed, stored, and utilized" (p. 351). Ford et al. (1989) point out that factors such as the number of attributes or dimensions to conceptualize a domain, the range of values that each attribute can take, and the form used to represent the attri-butes in memory (semantically, visually, numerically) affect information processing tendencies.
The relation between mental model content and cognitive processing is a complex one, and the boundaries between the two entities are often ambiguous. However, the point is that individuals with the same cognitive structures may not process information in the same manner. Thus, when it comes to issues such as the way in which a particular stimulus elicits or stimulates memory (the knowledge or belief structure), the nature of memory search processes (e.g., depth of search, sequence, latency), and the decision strategies that are followed (e.g., linear, noncompensatory, elimination by aspects), team members might differ considerably.
The Importance of the Task Context
In addition to the subtle distinctions between knowledge and belief structures and structure and processing, the measurement focus of this article forces us to attend specifically to the type of team task that is being performed and the purpose for which the measurement of mental models is being pursued.
Although it remains to be resolved empirically, our contention is that the task context must be specified before the issue of appropriate measurement strategies can even be approached.
More specifically, investigators of shared cognitive structures must clearly specify the performance domain of interest to evoke the right cognitive structures. For example, the nature and role of team mental models in team training (e.g., new equipment) are likely to be different from those that would be found in a team performance situation demanding spontaneous or implicit coordination. Similarly, even within a given context, what the team is trying to do (e.g., diagnosing the situation vs. taking action) is likely to affect the mental models that are being used.
To illustrate further, Ho and Keller (1994) differentiated between diagnostic tasks, in which participants associated observed effects with prior events, and predictive tasks, in which participants anticipated outcomes. In two studies using professional auditors and MBA students, they found that when participants had experience with the task domain, making predictions first influenced subsequent diagnostic judgments. Interestingly, diagnoses were not influenced by predictions when participants had little experience with the case.
Although Ho and Keller's (1994) work was conducted at the individual level of analysis, it is important for this discussion on team mental model measurement because it shows that the specific cognitive task will, in part, determine those mental models that should be measured. Many real-world team tasks, such as maintaining high situation awareness (e.g., Wellens, 1993) , involve both diagnosis and prediction, and team members often have varying levels of experience or expertise with a domain. Relating to the distinctions made previously, we would need to know how issues of Mohammed et al. / TEAM MENTAL MODELS 127 content, structure, and processing differ for diagnostic tasks as opposed to predictive tasks. Consequently, we have to consider the possibility that different techniques will be differentially suited for the measurement of mental models in the service of diagnosis, prediction, or both.
To summarize the discussion of the conceptual issues delineated above, selecting a group-level cognitive structure measurement technique must begin with a clear specification of the phenomenon that is to be tested and modeled. The lack of definitional clarity has been a major criticism of this area of research (e.g., Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994) , and the conceptual distinctions between knowledge and belief structures and structure and processing are rarely made in the team cognition literature. Furthermore, task context is often given insufficient attention in the conceptualization and measurement of team mental models. However, we believe strongly that these and related issues need to be addressed because of their relevance to our review of feasible measurement techniques.
The Selection of Four Team Mental Model Measurement Techniques
In addition to a lack of adequate conceptual development, confusion over how to measure group-level cognitive structures has hindered empirical work on team mental models. Having laid a conceptual foundation above, the remainder of this article will focus on the description and evaluation of four techniques designed to measure cognitive structure.
Several authors have previously described and classified techniques for measuring cognitive phenomena. For example, Hoffman, Shadbolt, Burton, and Klein (1995) reviewed various methods for eliciting knowledge from experts, including protocol analysis, interviews, and decision analysis. In addition, Walsh (1995) reviewed many potential tools of interest to investigators in the area of organizational cognition. A number of researchers (e.g., Campbell, 1996; Hoz, Champagne, & Klopfer, 1992; Jonassen et al., 1993) have summarized various approaches to assessing and representing cognitive structure, including hierarchical clustering, tree diagrams, and word association. Furthermore, Carley and Palmquist (1992) discussed techniques used to depict mental models, and Ford et al. (1989) evaluated a related theme of cognitive process-tracing methodologies.
Although the references listed above are concerned with individual-level cognitive structures, our article differs from the previous research in that we are focusing on team-level mental models. In addition, whereas earlier work focused on knowledge structures, we expand the discussion to include the measurement of belief structures.
Taking a multidisciplinary approach, we reviewed the psychology (industrial/ organizational, social, cognitive), education, strategic management, and organizational behavior literatures and identified four measures to review in detail: PF, MDS, interactively elicited cognitive mapping, and text-based cognitive mapping. Although many other possibilities exist from the plethora of cognitive measurement techniques (e.g., repertory grids, verbal protocols, card sorting, cluster analysis), we selected this particular subset of techniques primarily because they have been successfully used to assess cognitive structures, and it is our contention that these four methods are potentially useful in the study of team mental models.
In reviewing the literatures, we maintained our view that a measure of team mental models should reveal the degree of convergence among team members with regard to the content of known elements and the relationships between elements (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994) . Therefore, we chose only to review techniques that encompassed both elicitation and representation. Elicitation refers to the technique used to determine the components or content of a mental model. Representation refers to the technique used to reveal the structure of data or determine the relationships between elements in an individual's mind. Table 1 lists a sampling of empirical team mental model studies and the elicitation and representation tools that they have used. It should be noted that individual-level mental model research is not included in this table. As shown in Table 1 , the most common elicitation methodologies in the study of team mental models are similarity ratings and Likert-scale questionnaires. The studies using Likert-scale questionnaires emphasize elicitation in that they measure the degree of sharedness between team members (e.g., r wg intragroup agreement index) on items tapping various forms of teamwork functioning without capturing the underlying organizational structure of an individual's or team's knowledge domain. Therefore, we will discuss questionnaires as data elicitation tools but not as mental model measurement techniques.
Those techniques that include both elicitation and representation include PF, MDS, concept mapping, card sorting, and UCINET (a network analysis program; Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 1992) . We chose to evaluate PF and MDS. Concept maps are organized and hierarchical representations of information in a particular conceptual domain (Novak, 1990) . Unlike PF and UCINET, elicitation and representation are combined in that participants place prelabeled concepts in a prespecified hierarchical structure representing a particular knowledge domain (e.g., Marks et al., 1997; Minionis et al., 1995) . Because it is limited to a hierarchical structure and can impose this type of structure even when it does not exist, we chose not to include concept mapping in the subset of techniques examined.
Card sorting is a time-honored assessment technique in psychology that involves writing concepts on cards and asking respondents to sort the cards and position them as to what is closest to what (e.g., Hirschman & Wallendorf, 1982) . However, whereas PF elicits similarity judgments on which correlations can be calculated, card sorts elicit placement judgments only. UCINET (Borgatti et al., 1992) , a network analysis program used mostly in the social network literature, computes a Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) correlation between two matrices. We chose to evaluate PF over UCINET because PF has been validated more extensively and offers more statistical options.
Although we carefully selected the techniques reviewed in this article according to the rationale and considerations delineated in the preceding paragraphs, we want to emphasize that we are not stating that these are the only four techniques that can or should be used to measure team mental models. Our intention is not to denigrate or dismiss any of the cognitive assessment methodologies that we do not have the space to address. Rather, the overarching purpose of this article is to encourage researchers to think rigorously and critically about the measurement issues underlying team mental models. In this regard, we encourage the reader to evaluate the measurement tool of their choice according to the criteria we have developed.
A brief description and key example of each of the four chosen techniques is provided below.
PF
PF is a relatively new technique that is intended to produce appropriate psychological scaling with regard to the underlying structure between concepts (Schvaneveldt, 1990) . The PF algorithm transforms raw, paired comparison ratings into a network structure in which the concepts are represented as nodes and the relatedness of con- Kraiger, Krause, and Hart (1996) Similarity ratings Pathfinder Schmidt, Kraiger, Winckler, and Smith-Jentsch (1998) Similarity ratings Pathfinder Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Milanovich (1999) Similarity ratings Pathfinder Goodwin (1997) Similarity ratings UCINET Heffner, Mathieu, and Goodwin (1995) Similarity ratings UCINET Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, and Cannon-Bowers (2000) Similarity ratings UCINET Marks (1997) Strategic concept Strategic concept mapping mapping Marks et al. (1997) Concept Jenkins and Rentsch (1995) Teamwork schema questionnaire Levesque, Wilson, and Questionnaire measuring team's Wholey (1999) process, task, and performance Rentsch, Burnett, McNeese, and Pape (1999) Teamwork schema questionnaire Rentsch et al. (1998) Teamwork schema questionnaire Webber, Chen, Marsh, and Strategic team mental model Payne (1998) questionnaire cepts are represented as links between nodes (Schvaneveldt, Durso, & Dearholt, 1989; Schvaneveldt, 1990) . PF has been used to study a wide range of cognitive structures (e.g., Cooke, 1992b; Durso & Coggins, 1990; Schvaneveldt, 1990 ) in a variety of domains such as training (e.g., Goldsmith & Kraiger, 1997; Kraiger, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 1995) , humanmachine interaction (Durso & Coggins, 1990) , and studies of expertise (Schvaneveldt, Durso, Goldsmith, Breen, & Cooke, 1985) .
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Key example. Goldsmith, Johnson, and Acton (1991) used PF to test the relationship between students' cognitive structures of statistical information and classroom learning. The students and the instructor judged the relatedness of 30 statistical concepts taught in the course. These data were subjected to PF analysis, yielding a network representation of each participant's cognitive structure. The students' and the instructor's networks were compared using a variety of quantitative indices. The results showed that students who performed well on the course final exam had cognitive structures more similar to the instructor's than students who performed poorly. Furthermore, the top five students had similar cognitive structures, but the bottom five students had unique cognitive structures. This study illustrates how cognitive structures may be compared using PF and demonstrates that cognitive structure similarity predicts performance dimensions.
MDS
MDS is a set of geometric models that represent proximity data spatially (Carroll & Arabie, 1980; Schiffman, Reynolds, & Young, 1981) . Based on the assumption that geometric distance can represent psychological similarity (Davison, 1983) , MDS is particularly useful in identifying the unknown underlying dimensions used to cognitively organize stimuli (Kruskal & Wish, 1978; Nunnally, 1978) .
MDS represents cognitive structures in n-dimensional space, and the dimensions are assumed to be continuous (Davison, 1983) . The resulting MDS solution, calculated based on similarity data, presents stimuli in relation to the underlying dimensions.
MDS has been applied to a wide range of topic areas, including the study of social perception and cognition (Jones, 1983) , cognitive processes and learning (Shoben, 1983) , vocational psychology (Rounds & Zevon, 1983) , personality impressions (Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968) , social episodes (Forgas, 1978) , organizational meanings (Rentsch, 1990) , negotiated belief structures , work outcomes (Billings & Cornelius, 1980) , organizational theory (Jones, 1983) , and political perceptions (Nygren & Jones, 1977) . Individual-difference scaling using Individual Distances Euclidean Distance (INDSCAL) has been applied frequently, particularly in the study of social cognition.
Key example. Forgas (1981) used individual-difference MDS to study college rugby teams' interpretations of social episodes. Two teams with 15 members each participated in this study. Team 1's players had similar ability levels, trained together routinely, and interacted socially. Team 2's players had differing ability levels and did not train or socialize together regularly.
Team members rated 18 social episodes on 10 bipolar scales derived from previous research and participant comments. These ratings were converted to dissimilarity Mohammed et al. / TEAM MENTAL MODELS 131 measures and submitted to INDSCAL analysis. The best fitting solution for Team 1 was a three-dimensional solution (labeled friendliness, intimacy, and active) that accounted for 72% of the variance. For Team 2, the best fitting solution explained 61% of the variance and was a two-dimensional solution (labeled evaluative and friendliness).
The results of this study indicated that the teams' descriptions of their social environments were related to the type of member interactions occurring within the team. For example, Team 1's descriptions were more integrated and had a higher degree of consensus among team members than did Team 2's descriptions. This study represents how MDS can be applied to team-level analysis and used to study qualitative differences in the cognitive representation of social reality.
Cognitive Mapping
Cognitive mapping methodologies are graphic representations of both the content and structure of individuals' idiosyncratic belief systems in a particular domain (Axelrod, 1976; Eden, 1988; Fiol & Huff, 1992; Swan, 1995) . Whereas PF and MDS are used primarily by researchers in various areas of psychology and education, cognitive mapping is used extensively by researchers in organizational behavior, strategic management, and political science. It was one of the first cognitive measurement techniques to be introduced into management research (Stubbart & Ramaprasad, 1990) and has been used to study decision making, negotiation, organizational cognition, and strategy (Bonham, 1993; Bougon, Weick, & Binkhorst, 1977; Eden, Jones, Sims, & Smithin, 1981; Stubbart & Ramaprasad, 1989) . Cognitive mapping has generated enthusiasm as a methodological tool because it provides a way of accessing large, untapped sources of data generated by organizations and examines meaning as a relational phenomenon (Bougon, 1983) .
Because concepts can be linked by various types of relations (e.g., contiguity, proximity, continuity, resemblance, implication, causality) (Bougon, 1983; Eden, 1988; Weick & Bougon, 1986) , different types of maps exist (Bougon, 1992; Fiol & Huff, 1992; Huff, 1990) . However, one form of cognitive map used frequently in the organizational literature is a cause (means-end) map, which represents the causal links between concepts in the following way: "concept A has consequences for or can be explained by concept B" (Eden et al., 1981, p. 40) . According to Gray, Bougon, and Donnellon (1985) , "causality is conceptually and instrumentally the most potent of all relations" (p. 85). Because research in organizational literature has emphasized causal inferences embedded in managers'thinking, this summary will focus on cause maps.
There are two ways in which the content to be mapped can be generated Weick & Bougon, 1986 ). The first is by interactively requesting the data from participants through questionnaires and/or interviews (e.g., Bougon et al., 1977; Ford & Hegarty, 1984) , and the second is through post hoc analyses of data (e.g., systematic coding of documents or transcripts) (Carley, 1993; Levi & Tetlock, 1980) . Because each of these methods treats content differently and involves varying choice points and procedures, they will be discussed separately. The two types of mapping will be referred to as interactively elicited cause mapping (IECM) and text-based cause mapping (TBCM), respectively. quality of performance, rehearsal time) were obtained from naturalistic observation, discussion, and interviews. Via questionnaire, the jazz members specified which variables influenced other variables and the direction of influence (positive or negative). The analysis was done at the group level by combining the individual maps to form an average map (calculating the algebraic mean of the signed links). The authors concluded that representations of the organization and environment are stored in the minds of participants in the form of cause maps. As one of the early studies on cause mapping, it demonstrates how the technique can be applied at both the individual and group levels of analysis.
TBCM key example. Carley (1997) examined the relationship between TBCM and the performance of eight student software engineering teams. At the beginning of the semester, students' causal maps were coded from two open-ended questions using a map analysis technique that allows the researcher to extract cognitive maps, locate similarities across maps, and combine maps to generate a team map. Team performance was measured via a combination of client input and instructor ratings. The results indicated that members of successful groups, on average, tended to use more concepts and had larger causal maps than members of nonsuccessful groups. In addition, greater sharing of concepts was evident in successful as compared to nonsuccessful groups.
Critique of Four Techniques According to Specified Criteria
Researchers are continually confronted with the issue of how to evaluate the effectiveness of a measurement technique, but how do you know when you have a good measure of mental models? The dimensions we selected were derived from the traditional measurement literature and from specific features of cognitive measurement. We present these dimensions as seven questions that should be considered when critiquing techniques:
• How does the technique treat content?
• How does the technique treat and evaluate structure?
• Is there a standard, accepted procedure for the approach?
• What is the reliability evidence that supports the technique?
• Does the technique capture mental models?
• Does the technique have any special features such as noteworthy assumptions, weaknesses, or strengths?
• How can the technique be used in team-level analysis?
In this section, we first describe the importance of each of these standards in assessing the adequacy of cognitive measures and then use these standards to evaluate the four selected techniques (PF, MDS, IECM, and TBCM).
How Does the Technique Treat Content?
Obviously, the adequacy of the stimuli supplied to participants will greatly influence the nature of the resulting mental model. Therefore, the choice of content is very Mohammed et al. / TEAM MENTAL MODELS 133 important and should be guided by theoretical considerations, the performance domain of interest, and contextual variables.
Measurement techniques vary with regard to whether the cognitive content information is supplied by researchers or requested directly from participants. Supplied content is obtained from such sources as past research, examination of training materials, subject matter experts, and job analysis (Kraiger et al., 1995; Schvaneveldt et al., 1985) . Although supplied cognitive structure content tends to facilitate the comparison of structures across respondents and the comparison of an individual's structure at multiple points in time, the danger is that respondents' cognitive structure may not be sampled adequately.
Alternatively, by requesting cognitive stimuli directly from participants, researchers can better capture the individual's idiosyncratic cognitive structure content. However, a major disadvantage of an elicited approach is that comparisons across cognitive structures may be difficult due to peculiar and/or uninterpretable responses (e.g., Rentsch & Duffy, 1990) . Because most techniques requiring elicited content lack quantitative mechanisms for comparing cognitive structures, researchers typically apply a meta-cognitive structure (usually their own) to make these comparisons. This approach begs the question of whose cognitive structures are actually being studied.
PF and MDS: Relatedness judgments and paired comparison ratings.
Neither the PF or MDS techniques address content directly. Rather, mental model content is elicited by means of relatedness judgments, which are then submitted to PF or MDS to impose structure.
For PF, terms or concepts are most often obtained from either textbooks or subject matter experts (e.g., Gillan, Breedin, & Cooke, 1992; Goldsmith & Johnson, 1990; Goldsmith & Kraiger, 1997; Schvaneveldt et al., 1985) . Analogous to a job analysis at the individual level, various researchers advocate the use of a collective task analysis for use in teams, which can aid in the selection of appropriate mental model stimuli (Baker, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 1998; Bowers, Baker, & Salas, 1994) .
For MDS, the stimuli to be rated are obtained using a variety of methods such as scanning relevant research literatures (Billings & Cornelius, 1980; Howard & Howard, 1977; Walsh, 1988; Walsh et al., 1988) , in-depth interviews with subject matter experts (Markóczy & Goldberg, 1995; Rentsch, 1990) , introspection or researcher expertise (Brown & Stanners, 1983; Wish, Deutsch, & Kaplan, 1976 ), pilot research (O'Grady, Janda, & Gillen, 1979 Rentsch, Heffner, & Duffy, 1994; Wish et al., 1976) , task components (e.g., Diekoff, 1983; Pollard-Gott, 1983) , brainstorming (Frankel, Chan, & Lewandowski, 1984) , or some combination of the above methods (e.g., Frankel et al., 1984; Markóczy & Goldberg, 1995) .
The selection of stimuli for input into PF and MDS analysis requires careful consideration. For example, in contrast to homogeneous content domains (e.g., color), when applying MDS within heterogeneous content domains (e.g., freedom, justice), it is likely that the underlying dimensions for understanding the concepts may be obtained only if the domain is sampled thoroughly (Shoben, 1983) . As different methods of content elicitation produce different numbers and types of stimuli (Cooke, 1992a) , researchers are advised to use multiple methods for obtaining cognitive content to increase the likelihood that adequate sampling occurs. In addition, researchers must be aware that the chosen stimuli may be differentially meaningful to any given participant (Jones, 1983; MacCallum & Cornelius, 1977; Rentsch, 1990 ). Because they have been 134 ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH METHODS shown to affect cognitive structures, the context in which the stimuli are rated and the instructions given to participants must also be considered (Bisanz, LaPorte, Vesonder, & Voss, 1978; LaPorte & Voss, 1979 ).
An additional choice point regards the appropriate number of stimuli to present to participants. PF researchers generally use between 15 and 30 concepts (Goldsmith & Kraiger, 1997; Kraiger et al., 1995) . Generally, the greater the number of defined concepts, the better the resulting structure (Goldsmith et al., 1991) . With MDS, it has been suggested that five or more stimuli per dimension be used (Davison, 1983) . However, because of the time-consuming nature of data collection, many MDS studies use fewer than 20 stimuli (Frankel et al., 1984; Howard & Howard, 1977; Hoz et al., 1992; LaPorte & Voss, 1979; O'Grady et al., 1979; Preece, 1976 Preece, , 1978 . MacCallum and Cornelius (1977) suggest that effort be expended on selecting a large number of lowcomplexity stimuli to reduce measurement errors.
Once the number and type of stimuli have been selected by the researcher, pairs of items are presented to participants on computer or paper, and relatedness judgments are collected. Respondents are typically asked to make quick, intuitive judgments of the similarity between pairs of concepts on 5-to 9-point rating scales. Proximity data for MDS may be collected using rankings or rating responses, but ratings are considered to be more detailed and of higher quality (Carroll & Arabie, 1980; Nunnally, 1978) . Although relatedness could be due to several factors (e.g., causation, cooccurrence, dependency, contingency), respondents use their own internal standards and are generally not asked to specify their definition of similarity. Sometimes participants are instructed to first review all concept pairs before making their ratings (e.g., Goldsmith et al., 1991) or to develop a set of criteria on which to rate the concept pairs and continue to use the same criteria throughout the rating process (Ricci et al., 1997) . Branaghan (1990) notes that respondents find it easier to assign ratings to related pairs and are uncomfortable assigning weights to unrelated items.
Although ratings are usually made among all possible pairs of concepts, there is evidence that reducing the number of pairings achieves similar rating results as would be obtained from a complete pairing of all possible pairs. For example, when collecting performance evaluations using pairwise comparisons, McCormick and colleagues (McCormick & Bachus, 1952; McCormick & Roberts, 1952) found that randomly deleting about 25% to 35% of the judgments resulted in fairly high correlations with ratings based on complete pairings. In addition, Johnson, Goldsmith, and Teague (1995) used only a subset of all possible pairs of concepts and obtained PF structures with the same degree of predictive validity as structures derived from all possible pairs. According to Goldsmith and Kraiger (1997) , knowledgeable trainees can rate up to 200 concept pairs in 20 minutes, and Schvaneveldt et al. (1985) reported that participants made 435 similarity ratings in 30 to 45 minutes.
Paired comparison ratings have advantageous features over other methods (e.g., ordered recall, card sorts), including simplicity and high validity (Cooke, Durso, & Schvaneveldt, 1986; Cooke & McDonald, 1987; Neff, 1983) . In addition, acceptable test-retest reliability estimates have generally resulted (Campbell, 1996; Goldsmith & Johnson, 1990) . However, relatedness judgments are almost uninterpretable in their raw form because of the number of ratings and presence of noise in the judgments. Thus, they need to be transformed by means of scaling algorithms to obtain a more interpretable representation. PF and MDS are the two types of representations that will later be discussed.
IECM. IECM implies reliance on the terms, language, and concepts used by the people being studied (Eden et al., 1981) . The content to be mapped should consist of organizationally relevant mental relationships held by one or more individuals . Therefore, unlike PF and MDS, IECM is an idiographic approach, and participants themselves provide the content of the knowledge to be mapped. Much of the existing research using cause-mapping methodologies produces maps for key decision makers, including political elites (Axelrod, 1976) and company executives (Narayanan & Fahey, 1990) .
Interviews are a common means for collecting content information (Bougon et al., 1977; Ward & Reingen, 1990) , and they range from being deliberately open ended (Brown, 1992; Cossette & Audet, 1992; Eden et al., 1981) to being fairly structured (Bougon, 1983) . Additional elicitation techniques include questionnaires (Billings & Hause, 1989; Ford & Hegarty, 1984) , interactive computer programs (Ramaprasad & Poon, 1985) , and observations combined with interviews (Bougon et al., 1977; Roos & Hall, 1980) . Markóczy and Goldberg (1995) also recommend complementing the pool of constructs with items drawn from the relevant literature.
There is no straightforward approach to determining the number of constructs to include. Rather, the choice must be made based on the level of complexity and refinement desired (Stubbart & Ramaprasad, 1990) . Although some maps show between 6 and 20 nodes (e.g., Bougon et al., 1977; Huff, 1990) , others range from 30 to 120 concepts (e.g., Brown, 1992; Cossette & Audet, 1992; Laukkanen, 1990) . On the extreme end, some maps have included thousands of concepts and links (Eden, 1988 (Eden, , 1992 .
IECM allows great flexibility in the variables that are contained in cause maps (e.g., may be continuous or dichotomous) (Weick & Bougon, 1986) . Examples of content that has been mapped include important aspects of the job of a fire protection officer (Langfield-Smith, 1992) , topics in the Norwegian oil debate (Bonham, Shapiro, & Herdstveit, 1988) , concepts of importance to a jazz orchestra (Bougon et al., 1977) , and factors influencing business success (Markóczy, 1994) .
Although some cause-mapping researchers avoid imposing structure on the data and have no restrictions in the data elicitation process (e.g., Eden, 1988 Eden, , 1992 , others advocate detailing a replicable elicitation technique in order to be able to compare maps mathematically (e.g., Markóczy & Goldberg, 1995) . For example, some studies have used a fixed list of constructs, gleaned from interviews with participants (e.g., Bougon et al., 1977; Ford & Hegarty, 1984; Nelson & Mathews, 1991; Roos & Hall, 1980) . Suggesting another variation, Markóczy and colleagues (Markóczy, 1994; Markóczy & Goldberg, 1995) allow participants to select 10 relevant terms from a predefined set of constructs. To reduce memory demands in selecting the 10 terms, constructs were written on cards and sorted by participants into categories based on importance (Langfield-Smith, 1992; Markóczy, 1994) .
Once the relevant constructs have been elicited, participants are asked three questions for each pair: (a) whether one construct influences the other (zero indicates no relationship), (b) whether it does so positively or negatively, and (c) whether the influence is weak, moderate, or strong (e.g., Ford & Hegarty, 1984; Markóczy, 1994; Nelson & Mathews, 1991) . A technique called the MB-Matrix Questionnaire (Bougon, 1983) has been developed to collect the links that each person perceives among nodes in a nondirective and nonreactive manner. Because early judgments will affect later judgments, it is recommended that the presentation of variable pairs be ran-domized (Roberts, 1976) . In addition to causal information, participants may be asked which variables they believe they can influence (Bougon et al., 1977) , their confidence in causal judgments (Billings & Hause, 1989) , or their rationale for causality relations (Ford & Hegarty, 1984) .
TBCM. Unlike IECM, text-based maps are gathered through the systematic coding of transcripts or documents representing the writings or statements of an individual or group (Weick & Bougon, 1986 ). The assumption is that texts contain a representation of the author's mental model at the time when the text was written (Carley, 1994 (Carley, , 1997 . Whereas content analysis typically focuses on the frequency with which concepts are used in the text, TBCM extracts both concepts and relationships between concepts (Carley, 1993 (Carley, , 1997 . The researcher interprets the materials, elicits the important concepts, and generates the map. TBCM has been used extensively in foreign policy analysis (Axelrod, 1976) and organizational science (e.g., Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 1992; Fahey & Narayanan, 1989) .
Text-based cause maps have been generated from sources such as open-ended questions (Carley, 1997) , narratives (Nadkarni & Narayanan, 1998) , governmental publications (Fahey & Narayanan, 1989) , court cases (Fahey & Narayanan, 1989) , transcripts (Calori, Johnson, & Sarnin, 1994; Levi & Tetlock, 1980) , and annual reports (Barr et al., 1992; Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Fiol, 1989) . In general, verbatim transcripts are more valid sources of cognitive maps because public documents tend to be subject to intense scrutiny and self-presentation (Levi & Tetlock, 1980) . Annual reports have been criticized because they are prepared by public relations departments, are extensively edited, and suppress negative information (Barr et al., 1992) . Because the quantity of public documents is generally large, the researcher must adopt decision rules to sample the statements that will be coded (e.g., random sampling, stratification) (Fahey & Narayanan, 1989) .
How Does the Technique Treat and Evaluate Structure?
Structure provides information on how a set of elements within an individual's knowledge domain is organized from the perspective of the whole set. Many techniques allow for the graphical or pictorial representation of the cognitive structure, which can be more informative than a narrative or numerical representation. Methods vary with regard to the quantitative and qualitative structural information that they provide. For example, indices such as the degree of agreement among respondents'cognitive structures and the adequacy of the representation are available for some techniques. In addition, it is important that methods do not impose a structure when no consistent or detectable structure exists.
PF. The primary advantage of PF is that it reveals cognitive structure. The output of PF is a network representation (PFNET) in which relatedness between concepts is depicted by how closely they are linked, and weights represent the strength of the links (Schvaneveldt et al., 1989) . Symmetric or asymmetric proximities may be analyzed to produce nondirected or directed links, respectively (Cooke et al., 1986) . Typically, the algorithm only connects those concepts related most closely by links. Because it is theoretically possible for PF to yield unconnected networks, PF provides evidence for the lack of structure.
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PF offers many types of quantitative indices to evaluate cognitive structures, including coherence and closeness. Coherence measures the extent to which paired comparison ratings among knowledge components are nonrandom or internally consistent (Goldsmith & Kraiger, 1997) . The coherence computation is referent free and is based on the assumption that relatedness between a pair of concepts can be determined by examining the relationship of any given concept pair to other concepts in the knowledge domain (Schvaneveldt et al., 1985) . In contrast, closeness (C) is a referent-based measure examining the similarity between network structures containing identical concepts. C ratings range from 0 (complementary networks) to 1 (identical networks).
Other measures such as the number of links (indirect measure of knowledge structure complexity), distance between nodes in the network, levels of link strength, starness (used to determine levels of abstraction), and the z statistic (to produce composite networks) are also available to evaluate PFNETs (Eposito, 1990; Goldsmith & Davenport, 1990; Gualtieri, Fowlkes, & Ricci, 1996; Schvaneveldt et al., 1989) .
MDS.
Like PF, the strength of MDS is that it reveals structural information. However, unlike PF, MDS does not present links between stimuli. Rather, stimuli are represented in n-dimensional space. Although many MDS models exist (for reviews, see Carroll & Arabie, 1980; Kruskal & Wish, 1978; Schiffman et al., 1981) , we will focus on individual-difference or three-way MDS. Individual-difference MDS models are based on the assumption that one underlying set of defining dimensions exists for a group of respondents. Individual-difference solutions produce a dimensionalized space representing the stimuli and dimension weights for each individual. The dimension weights indicate which dimensions are most salient or important to each individual's representation of the stimuli (Schiffman et al., 1981) . Therefore, individualdifference models provide information about the individuals' cognitive structures and about the communalities within a group of individuals (Green & Rao, 1972) . In addition, individual-difference models are not prone to problems associated with averaging individual-level matrices (Ashby, Maddox, & Lee, 1994; Rounds & Zevon, 1983) .
The degree of cognitive structure represented in individual-difference MDS models is revealed in a fit statistic, R 2 , which indicates the goodness of the fit of the solution. MDS can theoretically indicate the lack of structure by means of a low R 2 . In addition, MDS representations may be compared by using Schonemann and Carroll's (1970) method for fitting one matrix to another to evaluate the correspondence between the stimulus coordinate configurations for each MDS solution. The degree of correspondence is assessed using the coefficient S, a symmetric, 0-1 bound value developed by Lingoes and Schonemann (1974) . A larger S value indicates a poorer correspondence between the representations.
IECM. IECM structures are most commonly represented as association matrices and/or maps (diagrams) (Stubbart & Ramaprasad, 1990) . Matrices represent concepts as an n × n array, in which rows stand for causes and columns stand for effects. Nonzero entries in the matrix show the concepts that are connected to other concepts in the map. Matrix arrays are useful for computer analysis but cannot be easily inspected visually. Conversely, maps are easy to inspect visually but do not lend themselves to computer analysis. In either case, directional and nondirectional links between concepts can be assessed, and the absence of causal structure can be identified. Although some researchers construct a map without further involvement from participants (Roos & 138 ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH METHODS Hall, 1980) , others involve the participant in validating the researchers' portrayal (Eden, 1992; Langfield-Smith, 1992) .
Structural information can be captured in a variety of quantitative and qualitative indicators derived from the content and configuration of maps. Given the large number of available options, Eden, Ackermann, and Cropper (1992) warn that interpreting analyses will be problematic unless a clear theoretical framework and analytic purpose have been delineated.
Cognitive complexity can be measured through the number and nature of concepts evoked as well as through the ratio of the number of links to the number of concepts . Specifically, differentiation (the number of characteristics or dimensions of a problem that are included) and integration (the number of connections between differentiated concepts) can be quantified (Weick & Bougon, 1986) . However, because the number of constructs elicited during an interview is dependent on the skills of the interviewer and the length of the interview, analyses that depend on the number of nodes should be approached cautiously (Calori et al., 1994; Eden et al., 1992) .
The centrality or importance of a concept can be derived by means of outdegrees (sum of the absolute values across rows, which tells how many other variables a specific variable affects directly) and indegrees (sum of the absolute values of the columns, which indicates how many variables influence a given variable) (Cossette & Audet, 1992; Nelson & Mathews, 1991; Weick & Bougon, 1986) . In addition, the extent to which a map may be broken apart into smaller maps via cluster analysis has been used to distinguish core and peripheral constructs Ward & Reingen, 1990) .
Other structural indices include feedback loops and the shape of the map. The number and strength of feedback loops can be used to imply the existence of dynamic cognition (Axelrod, 1976; Bougon & Komocar, 1990 ). In addition, flat cause maps indicate a high range of alternatives and little depth of thinking, whereas tall, thin maps suggest detailed arguments without consideration for alternative definitions .
The techniques available to make comparisons between maps differ, depending on concept elicitation techniques. Daniels, Markóczy, and Chernatony (1994) distinguish between rating comparisons and mathematical comparisons. Rating methodologies involve secondary coding of the data through content analysis and are most appropriate when researchers place no restrictions on participants' choice of constructs during elicitation. Determining the overlap between pairs of maps is difficult in this case because two maps may contain different concepts, different words for the same concepts, or even the same word for different concepts (Daniels et al., 1994) .
Compared to rating methodologies, mathematical methodologies allow for easier comparison between causal maps but necessarily involve imposing some sort of structure on the data by limiting the number of constructs that can be used or only allowing comparisons between maps with some nomothetic component (Daniels et al., 1994) . Langfield-Smith and Wirth (1992) developed the first quantitative technique for comparing causal maps by calculating distance ratios. Their formula takes into account the three ways in which causal maps may differ: different nodes, links in different places, and links of different strengths between the same pair of nodes. The logic behind the formula is to sum up all of these differences and divide by the total number of nodes in each map and the number of nodes common to each map. A distance ratio of 0 indicates that the maps are identical, and a distance ratio of 1 means that they are maximally different. However, distance ratios do not capture the fact that some constructs are more different than others (e.g., income vs. earnings vs. sales). Markóczy and Goldberg (1995) modified and expanded the Langfield-Smith and Wirth (1992) formula to generalize to maps with different strength values and other variations. In addition, Laukkanen (1994) has specifically designed software (CMAP2) for comparative cause-mapping processing tasks.
TBCM.
A detailed coding scheme developed by Wrightson (1976) is commonly used. Coders search for sentences, phrases, or paragraphs that assert relationships. A plus sign indicates a positive relationship (e.g., increases, promotes, leads to, contributes to), and a minus sign indicates a negative relationship (e.g., decreases, detracts, does not depend on). The most simple structure is "cause concept/linkage (+ or -)/ effect concept," but eight types of structural relationships and special cases are delineated in the manual (Wrightson, 1976) . As closely as possible, the wording of the original document is maintained, and coders must simultaneously attend to both the content and the structure of the text (Wrightson, 1976) .
The strength (number of times that a relationship is mentioned), sign (positive or negative), and direction (unidirectional or bidirectional) of relationships can be coded (Carley, 1993; Carley & Palmquist, 1992) . The two major structural properties of TBCM are complexity and centrality (Nadkarni & Narayanan, 1998) . The number of concepts (comprehensiveness) and the ratio of links to the total number of concepts (density) are aspects of complexity. Centrality refers to the degree to which the map is focused on a single concept (Calori et al., 1994; Nadkarni & Narayanan, 1998) . A variety of software routines exist for TBCM, including Netanalysis (Nadkarni & Narayanan, 1998) and Automap (Carley, 1997) .
Modifications have been made to Wrightson's coding procedure in order to accommodate specific research needs (e.g., Huff, Narapeddy, & Fletcher, 1990; Levi & Tetlock, 1980) . For example, Levi and Tetlock (1980) developed the specific coding convention of a causal package or chunk because the coding rules do not address the issue of interactive causation (two or more variables in combination are stated to lead to a particular effect).
At the end of the coding procedure, the concepts connected by codes are assigned a letter and repetitive concepts are merged (Wrightson, 1976) . Maps are then created by connecting concepts with arrows labeled with a symbol for the type of relationship involved (Barr et al., 1992) . Some researchers use both matrix and network map representations (e.g., Fahey & Narayanan, 1989) . It is often advantageous to position the most central concept in the middle of the map and the least central and most unconnected concepts on the edge of the map (Bonham, 1993) . Because the raw map is often enigmatic due to its complexity, it often has to be simplified by aggregating elements (Fahey & Narayanan, 1989) . Interestingly, unlike interactively generated maps, textbased maps rarely contain feedback loops (e.g., Axelrod, 1976; Levi & Tetlock, 1980) . Carley (1997) describes a procedure for combining text-based, coded individual maps to derive a team map. Maps are compared by counting the number of shared concepts and linkages in a map and then combined by creating either a union or intersection file. The researcher determines how many team members must share statements to be part of the team map.
Is There a Standard, Accepted Procedure for the Approach?
Most cognitive measurement techniques can be applied with variations. The presence of accepted procedures for applying these variations is desirable because standardized procedures are likely to reduce researcher biases and to enhance robustness (Markóczy & Goldberg, 1995) . We report the tools associated with each technique such as statistical computations, computer programs, and data collection methods.
PF.
A relatively user-friendly PF program (KNOT; see Schavaneveldt, 1990 ) is available for use on IBM compatible and Macintosh computers. For any set of data, a family of PF networks can be produced, depending on the number of links that are permitted. Using this program, the standard, accepted procedure is to compute the least dense (or least complex) PFNET and then add to it (Cooke, 1992b) . The PFNET chosen as most representative of the cognitive structure being assessed is that which is least dense, yet most interpretable. Therefore, the goal is to account for the maximum variability in the data with a minimum number of parameters (Schvaneveldt et al., 1989) .
The PF program provides statistics that can be used to aid in the selection of the best PFNET. However, Schvaneveldt et al. (1989) state, "The rules on when to stop, however, are not easy to define for all cases" (p. 276). Therefore, it is possible for two researchers to reach different conclusions about the same respondent's cognitive structure using PF. As described earlier, the C statistic and coherence index are commonly used to interpret PF results (e.g., Goldsmith & Johnson, 1990; Goldsmith & Kraiger, 1997; Gualtieri et al., 1996; Ricci et al., 1997) .
MDS.
A researcher's choice of an MDS model will depend on the nature of the research question and the nature of the data to be collected. Although all individualdifference models use some type of Euclidean distances to represent the stimuli in n-dimensional space, individual-difference models vary in many ways. The models differ in terms of the spatial components, which specify the relationship between the coordinates, and the distance components, which specify the relationship between the proximity data (Spence, 1983) . Furthermore, each computer program fits a unique model (Spence, 1983) . This flexibility is an advantage to the well-informed researcher; however, the vast availability of choices can also lead to problems.
Regardless of the chosen model, the researcher must also determine the appropriate number of stimuli to present to participants and the appropriate number of dimensions to be interpreted, which are interrelated decisions. In determining the dimensionality, one should consider the number of stimuli, goodness-of-fit measures, and the interpretability of the solution. Davison (1983) suggests that the expected number of dimensions be determined a priori and that five or more stimuli per dimension be used. Using another decision rule, Kruskal and Wish (1978) suggest that the number of stimuli minus one should be at least four times the number of dimensions. Regarding dimensionality, Kruskal and Wish recommend that researchers select the number of dimensions using variance explained (R 2 ) as the goodness-of-fit measure when using the INDSCAL analysis. On the other hand, Davison suggests plotting the fit measure by the number of dimensions and selecting the solution that appears at the elbow, which can be ambiguous. Nevertheless, the trend is to select a small number of interpretable dimensions (Kruskal & Wish, 1978; Schiffman et al., 1981) . Spence (1983) Mohammed et al. / TEAM MENTAL MODELS 141 warns against staring too long and hard at the spatial representations in an effort to determine interpretability because one's imagination may overembellish what is actually represented.
IECM.
Researchers do not even share the same conception of a cognitive map, so there are significant variations in the way a map is constructed, its content, and its analysis . However, the following steps are common to many causemapping procedures (Nelson & Mathews, 1991) : variables important to participants are collected, participants identify what causal relationships exist between the variables, and responses are set in an asymmetric matrix or a map is drawn.
One established software package for cause map analyses is COPE (Eden et al., 1981) , a Windows-based program. COPE can handle many types of analyses and allows for graphic display of parts of a map and interactive use with research participants or teams (Brown, 1992; Cossette & Audet, 1992; Eden et al., 1992) .
TBCM. Fahey and Narayanan (1989) delineate a five-step process for creating revealed causal maps from archival data: select data sources, derive the concepts and linkages of the raw cognitive maps, recast causal assertions into theoretical categories, aggregate cognitive maps over time periods, and specify the strengths of causal relationships. point out that the source of information, the scale and detail of maps, and the features specific to each type of map are dependent on the purpose for which the map was drawn. In the final analysis, the scale and detail of the map represents a compromise between theoretical goals and practical concerns.
What is the Reliability Evidence That Supports the Technique?
Most measures of cognitive structure have only a limited amount of psychometric data (Hoz et al., 1992; Tessmer, Perrin, & Bennett, 1998) . Nevertheless, reliability is an essential criterion in the psychometric evaluation of traditional measures and sets the upper bound of validity (Ghiselli, Campbell, & Zedeck, 1981; Sackett & Larson, 1990; Schmitt & Klimoski, 1992) . Test-retest reliability is perhaps the most informative type of reliability evidence for cognitive structure measurement techniques. However, to the extent that the act of completing cognitive measures facilitates meaningful learning, test-retest reliabilities would decrease. The stability of cognitive structure measures will depend on a number of factors, including the content of the concept list, the subjects' prior knowledge about the concepts, and the method of administration (Tessmer et al., 1998) .
PF.
The reliability evidence for PF is rather sparse (Ricci et al., 1997; Tessmer et al., 1998) , and most of the studies that have assessed the stability of PF representations are limited by a small sample size (between 8 and 40 participants). Gualtieri et al. (1996) examined the stability of PF indices over five trials and found that after an initial increment in scores between the first and second administrations, PF produced stable measures of an individual's knowledge structure in terms of coherence and similarity. In a further exploration of PF stability, Ricci et al. (1997) found that in the absence of a training intervention, PF coherence and link strength scores remained stable over the course of three task administrations. Furthermore, Cooke et al. (1986) replicated the same finding with regard to the effectiveness of PF as a predictor of free recall organization across six different networks, indicating that the finding was not attributable to idiosyncratic features of particular networks.
Other evidence with regard to PF reliability has been less supportive. For example, Goldsmith and Johnson (1990) examined the correlation between repeated ratings of the same concept pairs and found them to average .60. Also finding test-retest correlations below the .80 requirement of Carmines and Zellers (1979) , Tessmer et al. (1998) failed to find a high degree of consistency in PF measures. Furthermore, Gammack (1990) concluded that PF results were subject to noise and instability.
Taken together, existing results demonstrate the moderate reliability of PF representations. Learning tends to increase the stability of PF measures (Tessmer et al., 1998) , and PF indices are more stable for experts than for novices (Ricci et al., 1997) . In addition, because multiple PF administrations may increase reliability, a practice trial prior to collecting data is recommended to eliminate practice effects for novices (Ricci et al., 1997; Tessmer et al., 1998) .
MDS.
Reliability evidence for MDS solutions had not been reported systematically, but several studies offer evidence to suggest that MDS is a reliable measure of cognitive structures. For example, groups of 20 students performed a word association task on 15 physics concepts, and the data were then submitted to an MDS analysis (Preece, 1976) . Without any training in the interim, three of the groups were retested several weeks later, and an INDSCAL analysis was conducted for each (test and retest) data set. The correlations between the dimension coordinates of the test and retest solutions ranged from .83 to .98, indicating a high level of stability at the group level. Three years later, Preece (1978) reassessed one of the groups and again concluded that there was substantial evidence supporting the reliability of MDS.
In another study, control group participants rated the similarity of a set of nouns, spent 5 minutes working on math problems, and then rated the similarity of the same set of nouns again (LaPorte & Voss, 1979) . Consistent with Preece's approach, reliability was calculated by correlating the dimension coordinate values of the first and second ratings, and coefficients ranging from .89 to .98 resulted. Also supporting the reliability of MDS, Howard and Howard (1977) found through 2-day, posttest analyses that elementary school children judged the relationships between 10 animals reliably. Axelrod (1976) performed extensive studies to ensure the reliability of cognitive map data gathered from written historical documents, no such work has been performed on data gathered by interviews (Brown, 1992) . However, because interactive cognitive mapping may depend largely on the interviewing skills of the researcher, low interrater reliabilities would be expected (Brown, 1992) . In addition, it is projected that test-retest reliabilities would also tend to be low because of forgetfulness, new events that occur in the interim, or a different focus of attention on the part of the participant (Brown, 1992) . Weick and Bougon (1986) point to the need for inferences to be triangulated and verified based on multiple measurement techniques.
IECM. Although

TBCM.
Reliability with TBCM is a matter of coders selecting and correctly interpreting the causal elements in the raw data. Axelrod (1976) performed extensive studies to ensure the reliability of causal map data gathered from written historical documents, and many studies have reported satisfactory correlations between coders (Bonham & Shapiro, 1976; Fahey & Narayanan, 1989; Huff & Schwenk, 1990; Levi & Tetlock, 1980; Narayanan & Fahey, 1990) . For example, Barr et al. (1992) found intercoder reliabilities of 93% agreement on whether a causal statement had been used and 93.4% agreement on the codes assigned.
Does the Technique Capture Mental Models?
When assessing construct validity, measured variables should "behave as expected" (Nunnally, 1978, p. 103) in terms of their relation to measured variables of other constructs that are logically and illogically related (Campbell, 1976; Ghiselli et al., 1981; Sackett & Larson, 1990) . Therefore, a variety of evidence is used to demonstrate that a given technique actually captures cognitive structures, including expert-novice differences in mental models (e.g., Goldsmith & Johnson, 1990; Schvaneveldt et al., 1985) , convergence of the results from multiple techniques, prediction of a known criterion (e.g., Cooke et al., 1986; Durso & Coggins, 1990) , and team member versus non-team member differences in mental models. In addition, the sensitivity of a measure to changes brought about by some intervention (e.g., instruction) is also reported as validity evidence (e.g., Goldsmith et al., 1991; Kraiger et al., 1995) . As noted by Campbell (1996) , because validity depends on the inferences that one makes from the data, it should be investigated each time a cognitive technique is used in a new context or with different stimuli. Schvaneveldt et al. (1985 Schvaneveldt et al. ( , 1989 have shown that PF represents intuitive relations expected between concepts (e.g., the temporal dimension that underlies scripts), distinguishes between basic-and superordinate-level categories, and captures the logical relations between time length terms. Goldsmith and Kraiger (1997) delineate three categories of evidence that have been collected in support of PF construct validity. First, PF results reflect known differences in knowledge and skill between groups of participants. For example, several studies of expertise revealed that PF differentiated between experts and nonexperts within several knowledge domains (Cooke, 1992b; Gillan et al., 1992; Schvaneveldt et al., 1985) . Second, a number of studies demonstrate that PF indices show changes between pretraining and posttraining administrations (Gualtieri et al., 1996; Kraiger et al., 1995) .
PF.
Finally, validity coefficients for PF generally range from .5 to .75 (Goldsmith et al., 1991; Goldsmith & Kraiger, 1997) and are typically higher than those obtained from raw ratings. PFNETs have been found to predict free recall order (Cooke et al., 1986) , category judgment time, and dimensional judgment time (Cooke, 1992b) . Goldsmith et al.'s (1991) results showed that C scores between students and instructors were significantly correlated with final course points. In addition, Kraiger et al. (1995) found that C scores related more to performance on a simulation task for participants receiving an advanced organizer before training than for participants receiving the same information after training.
MDS.
Construct validity evidence supporting MDS data comes from research in several literatures, including cognitive psychology, person perception, and social psychology. The results reported in this section are from studies in which two-or threeway MDS was used. Most of the validity evidence for MDS data is in the form of supporting a nomological network (e.g., Billings & Cornelius, 1980; Forgas, 1981; Preece, 1976; Rentsch, 1990; Walsh, 1988; Walsh et al., 1988) . Unfortunately, little predictive validity evidence exists for MDS data.
MDS has been found to represent the intuitive relationships expected between dimensions. For example, MDS-derived dimensions represented musical tones as would be expected based on music theory (Shoben, 1983) . Other evidence supporting the ability of MDS to capture mental models has been obtained through studies of reaction time, free recall, and analysis of analogies (Shoben, 1983) . In addition, MDSderived dimensions capture novice-expert (e.g., Pollard-Gott, 1983 ) and childrenadult differences (e.g., Miller & Gelman, 1983) .
MDS construct validity has been further evidenced through studies demonstrating the ability of MDS to track changes over time (Jones, 1983) . For example, MDS solutions represented the increased learning of music passages from the first to third listenings (Pollard-Gott, 1983) . MDS has been found to aid in understanding cognitive and affective processes (Jones, 1983; Neff, 1983) and can be useful in the development and testing of theory. Using INDSCAL analysis, Forgas (1983) found that social episodes were represented in terms of affective descriptors rather than objective situational characteristics. Thus, the salience of affect in cognitively representing social situations became apparent through the use of MDS.
IECM. Although many cause map researchers assume that maps represent something very similar to real cognitive processing (Bougon et al., 1977; Weick & Bougon, 1986) , it has not been empirically demonstrated that managers actually think in terms of cause maps . In fact, it has been argued that the mental algebra required by cognitive mapping is too rapid and labor intensive to serve as a model of human cognition (Stubbart & Ramaprasad, 1990) . According to Eden (1992) , "the proposition that any of the different types of cognitive maps we currently construct have an ability to describe, simulate, or predict thinking is clearly problematic" (p. 261). Rather, the ability of a map to be a model of cognition depends on the adequacy of the theory guiding the technique and the method of eliciting cognition (Eden, 1992) . Clearly, additional work is needed to ascertain "how maps map onto cognitive structures" (Brown, 1992, p. 305) .
Although causal-mapping techniques have been used extensively to gain insight into the belief systems of managers, they are not usually linked to dependent measures such as performance (Markóczy & Goldberg, 1995) . Thus, predictive validity evidence for causal-mapping data is lacking, and empirical studies assessing construct validity have been sparse. One study by Billings and Hause (1989) , however, found strong evidence to support the validity of causal judgments within cause maps generated from interviews. Specifically, causal judgments converged well with later (2 to 4 weeks) responses to the same causal links presented in sentence form. Response time data provided further construct validity evidence in that consistent responses between Time 1 and Time 2 had a faster response time than inconsistent responses. Furthermore, when Nicolini (1997) returned maps to interviewees as part of a validity check, they reported that the maps did capture their perception of the organization (Mean of 4.3 on a 5-point scale).
TBCM.
Studies assessing the psychometric properties of text-based causalmapping measures are virtually nonexistent in the TBCM literature. However, recent empirical work has begun to address this gap. For example, Nadkarni and Narayanan Mohammed et al. / TEAM MENTAL MODELS 145 (1998) found that measures of complexity and centrality captured different dimensions of the structure of causal maps. Specifically, cognitive ability related to the centrality of text-based causal maps derived from case study narratives elicited from students. Furthermore, both centrality and complexity were correlated with individual student performance. In fact, the structural properties of the causal maps were a better predictor of performance than cognitive ability. Similarly, Carley (1997) reported exploratory data that successful groups differed from unsuccessful groups with regard to the number of concepts, the size of the causal map, and the degree of sharing between maps.
Does the Technique Have Any Special Features Such as Noteworthy Assumptions, Weaknesses, or Strengths?
Additional features not captured by the questions discussed above might also influence a researcher's choice of a technique. Therefore, we note such logistical considerations as respondent time commitments and the level of expertise required of the researchers. Moreover, we evaluate the restrictions inherent in the technique, including the degree to which the technique might be influenced by the respondent's or the researcher's biases, requirements of the administrative setting, the administrative preparation, and the level of expertise required for administration, scoring, and interpretation.
PF. PF can be applied to a variety of mental model content (e.g., both declarative and procedural knowledge) (Cooke et al., 1986) and effectively reveal local information in cognitive structures. Unlike other techniques (e.g., cluster analysis), PF does not force a hierarchical structure unless one exists, thereby allowing for greater freedom in reflecting an individual's inherent cognitive structure (Cooke, 1992b; Cooke & Schvaneveldt, 1988) . In addition, PF has demonstrated favorable results over raw ratings and MDS in some studies (Cooke et al., 1986; Durso & Coggins, 1990; Schvaneveldt et al., 1989) .
Logistically, PF is a technique that requires relatively little time once the content stimuli are obtained. Structural assessments are less dependent on the misinterpretation of questions, the ability to explicate relevant knowledge, and the recall of episodic information than are other types of assessments (Goldsmith & Johnson, 1990) . However, researcher bias may enter the PF analysis when supplying the content and when determining the most interpretable PFNET.
In terms of limitations, PF cognitive structures are represented in two dimensions only, and missing data may be problematic (Schvaneveldt et al., 1989) . In addition, global relational information is not revealed, and there is a negative linear function between the number of concepts rated and the predictive validity of the C statistic (Goldsmith et al., 1991) .
With PF, more attention is given to understanding the structure of concept clusters than to the interpretation of the links (Goldsmith et al., 1991) . Therefore, the links are "semantically impoverished" (Cooke, 1990, p. 229) , and respondents may consider different types of relatedness for concept pairs when making similarity ratings (e.g., causation, co-occurrence, dependency, contingency). Although the nature of the links is not identified using the traditional PF approach, Cooke (1990 Cooke ( , 1992a has developed a Sorting, Clustering, and Naming (SCAN) procedure to label and interpret links.
MDS.
The primary advantage of MDS is that it offers a great insight into cognitive processes and structures. MDS may be useful in theory development and testing (Shoben, 1983) and in understanding affective processes and belief structures (e.g., Walsh et al., 1988) . Research has also shown that MDS techniques offer more information than conventional survey techniques (e.g., Forgas, 1983; Jones, 1983; Nygren & Jones, 1977) .
Another advantage to using MDS is that the number of respondents appears to have little effect on the quality of MDS solutions, although it is not clear what happens with fewer than 15 respondents (MacCallum & Cornelius, 1977) . In addition, although missing data may be problematic for some types of individual-difference analyses (Schiffman et al., 1981) , evidence suggests that a good MDS solution can be obtained with up to 60% missing data (MacCallum, 1978) . However, in cases in which more than 40% of the data are missing, it is preferable that the missing data be from different pairs of stimuli (MacCallum, 1978) . Whereas PF does well in situations in which the closest relations are of primary importance, MDS is better for capturing relations that are more distant (Durso & Coggins, 1990) . Therefore, it is reasonable to use both PF and MDS.
In terms of weaknesses, collecting similarity ratings for MDS analyses is time consuming and extensive. Therefore, many studies typically use a low number of stimuli (fewer than 20), which can be problematic (Shoben, 1983) . When large numbers of stimuli are presented, proximity data is often collected indirectly through sorting methods (Rosenberg et al., 1968; Walsh et al., 1988) or unidimensional ratings (e.g., Forgas, 1981) . However, both of these techniques appear to be less effective than the direct approach of having respondents rate the similarity of paired stimuli (Drasgow & Jones, 1979; Jones, 1983) .
Similar to PF, MDS programs are designed to reveal the structure of cognitions rather than to provide interpretation. Therefore, the underlying MDS dimensions are unlabeled. However, property fitting, a technique that regresses unidimensional ratings onto the dimensional coordinates, can be used to interpret (label) the underlying dimensions produced in the MDS solution (Kruskal & Wish, 1978) . A qualitative confirmation of the interpretations can be acquired by asking respondents to study MDS plots and to interpret the underlying dimensions.
Another weakness of MDS is that individual-difference scaling results are misinterpreted frequently (Spence, 1983) . Misinterpretation occurs due to the specification of individual-difference data as conditional or unconditional, which affects the normalization procedure that occurs in calculating the MDS solution. Although unconditional specification permits the comparison of results across respondents, participant's responses and subject weights cannot be compared meaningfully with conditional specification (MacCallum, 1977) . Users should be aware of the conditionality assumption because it will affect the types of interpretations that they may make. Although some individual-difference programs permit the user to specify the conditionality of the data, other programs set the assumptions. Spence (1983) noted that some researchers have reported empirical research comparisons of subject weights using INDSCAL, which uses the conditional assumptions implicitly. Therefore, comparisons based on these studies are questionable.
IECM.
Causal mapping has several attractive features. Participants supply their own content using their own terminology instead of the researcher imposing variables (Weick & Bougon, 1986) , and the mathematical flexibility of cause mapping permits maps to be represented in numerous ways. In addition, the matrix properties of cause maps permit a richer conceptualization and operationalization of complexity than found in traditional approaches (Eden, 1988; Nelson & Mathews, 1991) . Nicolini (1997) reported that cause maps gave greater emphasis to emotional aspects compared to other techniques. According to Brown (1992) , cognitive mapping provides an appropriate balance between technical adequacy (e.g., data amenable to analysis) and political acceptability (e.g., participant interest). Cause maps have been used as a decision tool to help clarify alternatives (e.g., Eden, 1988) and as an epistemological structure around which individuals organize their experience (e.g., Weick & Bougon, 1986) . Recent studies have successfully combined causal mapping with social network analysis to capture more variance in effects (Nelson & Mathews, 1991; Ward & Reingen, 1990) .
Whereas the interpretation of the links is ambiguous with MDS or PF, the type of relationship between constructs is clearly specified with cause mapping. However, some studies have found a focus on causal relations to be problematic for the content of their material (Bougon et al., 1977; Langfield-Smith, 1992) . In addition, cause mapping cannot accommodate cause-effect relationships that are conditional (Nelson & Mathews, 1991) . Furthermore, the meaning of no causal relationship differs among participants (Billings & Hause, 1989) .
In terms of limitations, a cause map is an expression of human perceptions and is subject to all the distortions and biases of any self-report method (Nelson & Mathews, 1991) . Biases, forgetfulness, social desirability, and reluctance to self-disclose sensitive material all limit the use of individual maps for understanding strategy . However, working with data from multiple individuals may reduce some of these concerns. In addition to subject bias, the researcher can exert quite a bit of interpretive influence in extracting the important constructs to be included in any map (Huff, 1990) . However, asking the participant to validate the map once it has been constructed can reduce researcher influence (Eden, 1988) . Furthermore, systematic comparisons between cause maps are problematic when results are highly unique to a given person (Daniels et al., 1994; Simons, 1993) .
Finally, compared to other research techniques, cause mapping is a very laborintensive and time-consuming method . The interviews used to elicit the critical variables last from 45 minutes to 2 hours (Langfield-Smith, 1992; Markóczy, 1994; Nelson & Mathews, 1991; Ward & Reingen, 1990) . Markóczy and Goldberg (1995) report that the causal relationships between 10 node maps could be collected in 1 hour, although there have been cases of respondents taking up to 4 hours (Brown, 1992) . Although Brown (1992) reports that participants quickly get involved in mapping and find it interesting and insightful, Langfield-Smith (1992) was not able to complete her study because of subject fatigue with the lengthy mapping procedure. Even more time and effort is required when participants validate the maps that have been drawn (Eden, 1988) . Because it is very labor intensive, mapping works best as a method for studying cognitive topics and for examining variance that is unexplained by other methods . Furthermore, due to the logistics involved, cause mapping is best suited to smaller sample sizes (Brown, 1992; Nicolini, 1997) .
TBCM.
Text-based cause maps are rich in descriptive detail and portray decision makers' thinking about their environment in operational terms (Fahey & Narayanan, 148 ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH METHODS 1989) . This method provides a way to examine the variety and development of complicated thinking over long periods (Barr et al., 1992; Bartunek, Gordon, & Weathersby, 1983; Fahey & Narayanan, 1989) . In addition, text-based maps can be used with noninvasive and nonreactive data collection techniques to avoid the recall biases of interviews (Axelrod, 1976; Barr et al., 1992) and the danger that the very process of eliciting the map by means of interviews may change the cognitions of the participant. Furthermore, not only is TBCM more economical than IECM in allowing the researcher to compare mental representations from a large number of people but TBCM can also help the researcher understand the perceptions of individuals who no longer exist.
According to Walsh (1995) , "the most fundamental challenge to researchers assessing a knowledge structure is to be certain that they are measuring the subject's knowledge structure and not their own" (p. 308). Unfortunately, a primary danger of TBCM is that a coder may impute his own assumptions into the coding. The researcher must make a large number of coding choices, and these choices can dramatically alter the resultant analysis (Carley, 1997) . Not only will this introduce distortion and coder bias but it also will create coder incongruence (Wrightson, 1976) . The interpretation of materials can rarely be checked with the subject, and even when interpretation can be checked, it is retrospective. Therefore, when dealing with archival data, researchers should provide evidence that their own perceptions have not contaminated the coding process .
How Can the Technique Be Used in Team-Level Analysis?
Discussion of the first six criteria was primarily at the individual level of analysis. However, our primary purpose is to evaluate measurement techniques for team mental models. Although team researchers have not employed these techniques extensively, we suggest that their use within the team context is feasible, based on our evaluation of the techniques.
Group-level cognitive structures can be measured in two primary ways. Individual measures can be aggregated to create higher level measures (aggregate measurement), or the collectivity can speak for itself (global measurement) (Axelrod, 1976; Schneider & Angelmar, 1993) . Most of the research has relied on aggregated data to represent group-level constructs (Nelson & Mathews, 1991; Roberts, Hulin, & Rousseau, 1978) , and all of the team mental model studies referenced in Table 1 use this approach. However, many researchers challenge the notion that group activity can be adequately described by a simple average of individual maps.
Despite the fact that social interaction, communication, and the relative power of group members all contribute to the development of shared cognitive structures, these phenomena are usually ignored when measures are aggregated (Schneider & Angelmar, 1993) . In addition, averaging implicitly assumes that every group member's contributions are of equal importance (Carron, 1982) and does not take into account that some differences or similarities may or may not be significant . Furthermore, averaging across qualitatively different knowledge structures may distort the group average and obscure interpretable structures (Campbell, 1996; Carron, 1982; Schneider & Angelmar, 1993) . Therefore, researchers should carefully consider Mohammed et al. / TEAM MENTAL MODELS 149 the conditions under which averaging individual-level data may or may not be appropriate, given the purposes of the research.
In contrast to aggregate measurement, global measurement better captures the social interaction processes (e.g., communication, negotiation, persuasion) occurring in the group and allows data to be assigned directly to the collective entity. With aggregation, the researcher integrates the cognitive structures, whereas with global measurement, the group performs the integrative function (Schneider & Angelmar, 1993) . Global measures can be elicited from questioning a key informant about the group's cognition (Hart, 1976) , observing group interaction (Donnellon, Gray, & Bougon, 1986) , or examining group products such as documents (Bartunek, 1984; Bettman & Weitz, 1983) and/or group performance on cognitive tasks (Hill, 1982) .
Both the research question and the nature of the constructs being measured need to be considered when deciding on global versus aggregate measures (Schneider & Angelmar, 1993) . For each of the four techniques, we discuss the feasibility of global and aggregate team measurement.
PF. Studies using PF (see Table 1 ) have averaged individual-level data to examine team-level cognitive structures. Although no known examples of global measurement exist, it would be feasible for group members to rate jointly the similarity between constructs to produce a team-level map. The similarity data would be subject to PF analysis, and members could then be asked to verify the map for accuracy.
MDS.
Studies using MDS (e.g., Forgas, 1981; Rentsch, 1993 ) have also averaged individual-level data to examine team-level cognitive structures. As with PF, no known examples of global measurement exist. However, group members could jointly rate the similarity between constructs to produce a team-level map. Clearly, additional reliability and validity evidence is needed to apply these techniques at the team level. For example, MacCallum and Cornelius (1977) report that it is not clear what happens with MDS when fewer than 15 respondents are used. Because of the small size of many work teams, this is an important issue for team researchers to investigate with regard to MDS at the group level.
IECM. Weick and Bougon (1986) list various types of collective cause maps. Average cause maps represent aggregated measurement in that the algebraic mean of the signed links reported by participants is computed and used to represent group-or organization-level cognition (e.g., Axelrod, 1976; Bonham et al., 1988; Ford & Hegarty, 1984) . For example, in the individual cause maps constructed by the 19 musicians in the Utrecht Jazz Orchestra (Bougon et al., 1977) , each cell entry was coded as either a -1, 0, or +1, depending on the nature of the causal relationship perceived. When these entries were added across individuals, the cell entries in the average map could range from -19/19 to +19/19, depending on the number of participants who thought that a relationship existed and the direction of the relationship. Causality relationships rated by a significant number of orchestra members were then treated as a consensual view of the orchestra. Because there is no guarantee that people are attaching the same meaning to concepts and the exchange between group members is not captured, the validity of the average cause map is difficult to assess (Scheper & Faber, 1994) .
In contrast, composite maps are determined by consensus arrived at through group discussion, Delphi, or other related techniques. Whereas average maps represent aggregated measurement, composite maps represent global measurement. Although composite maps have been attempted for research purposes (e.g., Langfield-Smith, 1992), they are most often used as an intervention technique to help groups reach consensus. Eden and colleagues (Eden et al., 1981; Eden, 1988) have developed a composite map approach to help teams work with messy problems called strategic options development and analysis (SODA). Individuals first describe their own individual cause maps, and then a composite map containing all of the concepts and relations found in individuals' maps is formed. As a collective entity, group members discuss and edit to build an acceptable team map, which represents more than the cognition of one person (Eden, 1988) . Over several sessions, each individual map absorbs more concepts from the group map and the group map absorbs more individuality (Eden et al., 1981) . Used in this way, composite maps facilitate coming to a consensus on the definition of the problem by allowing groups to diagnose disagreements and manage those disagreements (Diffenbach, 1982) . Cryptic or ambiguous labels may be purposely used to connect individual maps, despite the presence of conflicting views (Bougon, 1992) .
Because most composite maps reach in excess of 500 concepts and 700 linkages after aggregation (Eden, 1988) , it should be noted that this approach is especially burdensome logistically. Group members may experience anxiety, depression, or disillusionment because the process is slow, complicated, or divisive (Eden et al., 1981) . Moreover, Langfield-Smith (1992) was not able to complete a composite-mapping procedure because participants showed strain over repeated failures to reach agreement. Not only is composite cognitive mapping burdensome for participants but it can also present challenges at the analysis stage because of the interaction of several thousand concepts over the course of many workshops (Bougon, 1992) . Eden et al. (1981) have developed a computer program called COPE to help record, represent, and analyze large, collective maps. Individual maps are overlaid so that common concepts and links appear once, but unique features are also maintained for group discussion purposes. COPE analyzes large maps by either slicing the complete map into clusters that have a minimum number of intergroup links (25 to 30 concepts) or collapsing the model into smaller models containing only key concepts.
TBCM.
Global measurement has been assessed in that documents produced by collectives such as committees have been coded (Axelrod, 1976; Bartunek, 1984; Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Bonham et al., 1988) . In addition, assemblage maps (Weick & Bougon, 1986 ) are a form of aggregate measurement that has been used with TBCM. After coding written documents for causal relationships, the common cognitions of individuals are linked together through common nodes or concepts, and submaps are assembled into a single overall map (Hall, 1984) . Carley (1997) , for example, compared maps by counting the number of shared concepts and linkages across individual maps and then creating a team-level intersection file. However, because individual maps are tied together by the researcher, the ability of this approach to capture shared meaning among group members is limited (Scheper & Faber, 1994) . The opportunity to verify the resulting aggregated map with team members would increase validity, but this is often not possible.
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Summary of the Techniques
A summary of the evaluative dimensions for each of the four techniques discussed above is presented in Table 2 . This framework can serve as a guide for evaluating the credibility of these approaches and for identifying the technique(s) that might be most appropriate for a particular research question.
For example, the methodology selected will influence the content that is derived. PF and MDS require that the researcher supply the cognitive content and that this information be fixed across participants. However, with either of the cause-mapping techniques, content is elicited and is therefore more variable across participants. Thus, compared to MDS and PF, IECM and TBCM generally provide a richer and more complex content base that uses the terminology of the participant. Whereas the terms used with PF and MDS are generally all inputs (e.g., treatment, replication, experiment, confound) (Goldsmith et al., 1991) , IECM and TBCM link inputs and outcome variables (e.g., a high level of organizational experience, increased efficiency, the introduction of management information systems, the application of principles rather than of just regulations) (Langfield-Smith, 1992) . However, the benefit of enriched cognitive content must be balanced with the drawback that map comparison is particularly difficult with cause mapping, especially when unrestricted content elicitation techniques are used.
Referring back to the conceptual distinctions made earlier in the article, the techniques reviewed capture cognitive structure but, in and of themselves, do not reveal cognitive processing. Cognitive structures clearly predispose information processing in significant ways and are implicated in the service of attentional dynamics, information storage, and information retrieval. However, measurement techniques well suited for documenting shared knowledge structures (e.g., PF, MDS, IECM, TBCM) are typically not adequate for mapping collective information-processing tendencies. Rather, verbal protocol analysis and other similar methods better capture cognitive processes (e.g., Ford et al., 1989) . Clearly, the choice of technique is dependent on the research question and research context.
With regard to the distinction between what team members think about a phenomenon (knowledge structures) versus how they feel about it (belief structures), IECM and TBCM may be better suited to the measurement of belief structures as compared to PF and MDS. Both the imposed nature of the content and the type of content that is rated (e.g., birds, colors, terms from a course) make the effective assessment of evaluative judgments less likely with PF and MDS. In contrast, the direct elicitation and richness of cognitive content from participants with IECM and TBCM (e.g., factors influencing business success) may allow for a better measurement of beliefs. Because belief structures probably take longer to develop than cognitive structures, the fact that PF and MDS studies are typically conducted with novices or students and IECM and TBCM are generally conducted with knowledgeable participants in field contexts also supports the latter techniques in the measurement of evaluative judgments. Although this reasoning is based on how the techniques have traditionally been used, we want to point out that we see nothing inherent in PF or MDS that would preclude the assessment of evaluative beliefs. That is, all four techniques could be adapted to measure knowledge structures or belief structures, depending on the way that the content is selected, the type of content selected, and the expertise level of the participants. Although each of the four techniques models cognitive structure, it is important to note that the meaning of the linkages across approaches differs. Whereas both cognitive-mapping techniques offer causal interpretations of linkages, the meaning of the links in PF and MDS are not specified. Instead, the interpretation of the structure must be accomplished by applying additional tools such as SCAN (PF) or property fitting (MDS). However, MDS and PF have better established psychometric properties than either IECM or TBCM. Indeed, only studies using PF report adequate predictive validity evidence. It should also be noted that cause mapping requires a great deal more researcher skill than PF or MDS and that respondent demands are particularly high for IECM. Table 2 also summarizes the research on each of the four techniques evaluated with respect to aggregated and global team measurement. To the authors' knowledge, only IECM and TBCM have assessed group cognitive structures using both approaches.
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Parting Thoughts
From our perspective, the relevant question is not can group-level cognitive structures be measured but how best to do so given the research question. Therefore, this article seeks to promote the advancement of empirical research on team mental models by (a) highlighting the conceptual work that must precede the selection of any measurement tool, (b) delineating measurement standards for group-level cognitions, and (c) evaluating a set of four techniques that holds promise for measuring team mental models. We argue that the selection of a group-level cognitive structure measurement technique begins with researchers clearly specifying the phenomenon that they wish to understand and model. Only when this is done will it be feasible to consider a measurement approach along with its attributes, advantages, and disadvantages. Once an adequate conceptual foundation is laid, a set of criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of a measurement technique is needed. Although we make no claims that our evaluation system is exhaustive in identifying important features of cognitive structure measurement techniques, we believe that it will offer team researchers guidance in selecting a mental model measurement method. Clearly, there is no shortage of possibilities for cognitive measurement tools (e.g., Campbell, 1996; Hoz et al., 1992; Jonassen et al., 1993) . However, we chose to emphasize four techniques that hold promise for measuring team mental models and that illustrate the explanatory power of our evaluative criteria.
Because of the differences in PF, MDS, IECM, and TBCM with regard to data requirements, it is not feasible to do an empirical comparison of all four techniques based on a single data set. However, we would like to review a recent empirical study employing the measurement of team mental models that was conducted by Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, and Cannon-Bowers (2000) . In this experiment, the effect of shared mental model convergence on team processes and performance was examined using undergraduate, two-person teams performing a PC-based flight-combat simulation. Mathieu et al. conceptually and empirically distinguished between task work (behaviors necessary for the completion of work-related activities) and teamwork (members' interactions necessary to working together), and participants completed paired comparison ratings reflecting both types of mental models. The task and team mental models were then individually analyzed using the UCINET network analysis program (Borgatti et al., 1992) , which provided an index of convergence between team members' matrices. Results indicated that both types of mental models related posi-tively to team process and performance and that team processes fully mediated the relationship between shared mental models and performance.
Although Mathieu et al. (2000) did not use one of the four techniques reviewed in this article, there are several features of their article worth highlighting. First, the conceptual distinction made between team and task mental models demonstrates the importance of clearly specifying the phenomenon of interest before applying a measurement technique. In addition, the study examined the development of team mental models, process, and performance over time. Finally, the versatility of paired comparison ratings is underscored by the fact that UCINET, PF, or MDS could be used to analyze the data. Indeed, conducting all of the above would permit a nice comparison of all three measurement techniques, and studies of this type are very much needed in the team mental model literature.
As Table 2 suggests, we can argue for no one best technique, and we cannot argue to eliminate any of these techniques for the lack of potential in the study of team mental models. Rather, researchers must justify their choice of technique after considering the research question and research context carefully. Salient questions include the following: Is the important variance in structure or in content? Is content interesting in and of itself? Will the technique be used for diagnosis, training, and/or prediction purposes?
Because team mental models are extremely complex variables, multiple measures are required for a thorough assessment, and one should be wary of conclusions that rest on the use of a single method. Therefore, it is unlikely that team-related outcomes can be predicted effectively except by combining the strengths of different techniques. For example, the IECM practice of allowing participants to select from a fixed pool those constructs that are most meaningful to them could significantly enhance PF and MDS's limited treatment of content. In addition, having participants verify PF and MDS maps for accuracy could be adapted from IECM. Indeed, testing respondents to see if they could pick out the PF map based on their similarity ratings from other PF maps would provide an interesting validity check and could also be adapted to MDS and IECM.
In studies using multiple techniques, participants could be asked to rate how each map captures the characteristics indicated in the initial input and if they perceive substantial differences between the two representations (Nicolini, 1997) . This information would be especially useful if the research design included feedback to participants. Nicolini (1997) , for example, reported that respondents had difficulty perceiving the meaning of the arrows and the position of the nodes on causal maps. The challenge may be to find ways of revealing and presenting cognitive representations so that they are quickly understood.
Furthermore, across the different techniques, it would be worthwhile to conduct studies in which both global and aggregated measurement techniques are used in order to compare the resulting team mental models for similarities and differences. Because the existing empirical base is too limited to guide definitive choices, we would encourage creative applications across techniques in the study of team-level cognitive structures.
Although we have discussed several aspects of the importance of content, we have not really dealt with the extent to which the revealed content adequately captures the domain of concern. For example, if we are interested in obtaining and using a team mental model of team task work to predict or explain team effectiveness, just how exhaustive should this model be? Do we need to capture and describe every aspect of team members'structural knowledge or beliefs about team-level tasks, or would a sub-set of measured understanding be sufficient? Although the literature does not appear to be able to provide a definitive answer to these questions at this time, it is not completely devoid of guidance either. Clearly, the number of stimuli for assessing cognitive structures needs to bear some relationship to the content of the domain of interest. However, another perspective with regard to the notion of sufficiency builds on the idea of construct validity in that the completeness of a mental model depends on the way that stimuli link to cognitive categories, themes, or dimensions that are actually used in cognitive processing. Thus, it is very important to identify and use stimuli at the natural or appropriate level of abstraction in research (Porac & Thomas, 1990) .
A final thought on the issue of sufficiency is that decisions with regard to the nature and number of the stimuli to be used might also revolve around functions that cognitive structures are thought to perform in a context of interest. For example, if we are interested in the impact of team mental models on coordinated behavior, the particular stimuli used in measurement may be less important than the extent to which the stimuli results in structures that can reveal a shared understanding of such things as team member relative task competence or commitment as these are the types of functional knowledge presumed to underlie effortless coordination.
